GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.


 

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TICKET TO RIDE: US CORPORATE PROFITS AND S+P 500 TRENDS (c) Leo Haviland, May 17, 2017

In “Ticket to Ride”, The Beatles sing:
I don’t know why she’s riding so high
She ought to think twice
She ought to do right by me
Before she gets to saying goodbye”.

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CONCLUSION AND OVERVIEW

In offering enthusiastic audiences explanations of past, current, and future United States stock marketplace levels and travels, diverse marketplace preachers tell competing tales. Their arguments and conclusions reflect their different marketplace perspectives and methods, including the particular variables they select and arrange. For a majority of devoted visionaries, American corporate profitability is a very important factor.

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After-tax US corporate profits soared after reaching a trough in fourth quarter 2015, not long before the S+P 500’s major bottom in first quarter 2016. The noteworthy profit climb since 4Q15 surely encouraged the S+P 500 to jump from its 1Q16 trough.

Yet Trump’s remarkable triumph in November 2016’s Presidential election created (or at least magnified) faith that United States after-tax corporate profits would increase significantly in calendar 2017 and 2018. The S+P 500 galloped 15.2 percent higher from 11/4/16’s 2084 low to 3/1/17’s 2401 elevation. Thus hopes for greater profits probably greatly assisted the S+P 500’s sharp rally.

What is a key tenet (especially in the post-election period) in the gospel promoting a viewpoint of growing American corporate profitability and an entangled bull stock climb? Much centers on hopes that the Republican-controlled Congress will enact noteworthy corporate tax cuts. Related optimism for marketplace earnings (and stock) bulls includes possibilities for repatriation of corporate cash hoards, dramatic boosts in domestic infrastructure spending, and reduced regulatory burdens.

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However, current sharp divides on the American political scene (including within the Republican congregation) and widespread lack of confidence in (and hostility toward) the President will make it very difficult for a notable change in the corporate (and individual) tax code to become law. Passage of legislation encouraging earnings repatriation is not assured. Moreover, neither is a monumental infrastructure spending scheme.

In addition, despite the fierce climbs in recent calendar quarters, profit highs for recent full calendar years do not manifest a clear trend toward moving to new heights. Full calendar year profits over the past few years have been about flat.

Disappointment relative to widely-forecast profitability gains may inspire S+P 500 price retreats. In any case, history reveals that several noteworthy bear moves in the S+P 500 have intertwined with noteworthy profitability slumps.

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What is too high (too low), high (low), overvalued (undervalued), or reasonable/rational/average/normal (unreasonable, irrational, atypical/abnormal) for stock prices or other economic indicators is a matter of opinion. However, and even though stock valuations can appear very elevated relative for an extended period of time, some marketplace gurus nowadays proclaim that some measures show US stock valuations are on the lofty side.

Also, elevated share buyback levels also have helped to propel US equities higher. There are hints this pattern will not persist.

Current low US stock marketplace volatility, high American consumer confidence, and evidence that financial stress remains below average have reflected (and encouraged) the majestic bull climb in the S+P 500. Observers nevertheless should watch for changes in such measures.

A warning light for S+P 500 bulls is the failure the S+P 500 to motor much above the early March 2017 high. The subsequent record high is 5/16/17’s 2406. If the S+P 500 continues to find ventures much beyond that March 2017 elevation challenging, this arguably will signal that current optimism regarding future corporate profit gains may be ebbing, that the S+P 500 bull trend is tiring, or both.

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So the failure of America to enact important corporate tax “reform” (tax cuts) or embark on a glorious infrastructure spending voyage may not greatly diminish future earnings expectations (or even actual levels) or significantly wound the S+P 500. But they might.

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In addition, challenges to the bullish trend in US equities may come from the long run upward trend of US government interest rates (note the Fed’s tightening plan). Or, concern about US federal budget deficits (or debt problems elsewhere in the world) may march into view. Hopes for higher (or at least not falling) energy prices likely underpin hopes for higher corporate earnings (and profits) in that key financial sector. But commodities “in general” (and petroleum in particular) have fallen from their 1Q17 highs. Anticipated oil output levels from OPEC and its non-OPEC comrades probably will not significantly reduce still-high OECD industry inventories for at least the next several months. The broad real trade-weighted US dollar established highs in December 2016/January 2017, though it has slipped only modestly since then. Contrary to what many believe, increasing US dollar depreciation may help lead to or confirm weakness in the US stock marketplace.

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Ticket to Ride- US Corporate Profits and S+P 500 Trends (5-17-17)

“POPULISM” AND CENTRAL BANKS © Leo Haviland, July 12, 2016

“Big boss man, can’t you hear me when I call?” “Big Boss Man” (Al Smith and Luther Dixon), performed by Elvis Presley, the Grateful Dead, and others

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

The United Kingdom’s recent shocking referendum vote to leave the European Union not only sparked ferocious marketplace fluctuations. It did not merely underscore ongoing and widespread unease regarding mediocre economic growth and insufficient inflation in many nations inside and outside of Europe.

Brexit also highlighted previously existing and growing fears among many global economic and political elites (“the establishment”) and their disciples about increasing “populism” and its potential consequences. These worries extend beyond the troubles of the European Union and the Eurozone and nervousness regarding their fracturing or break-up. The British departure outcome probably inflamed populist ambitions in other countries. In any case, substantial divisiveness and partisan fervor are not confined to Europe or the United States. See “America: a House Divided” (12/7/15).

The “establishment”, like “populism”, is diverse rather than monolithic. Even among the advanced OECD nations such as the United States and those seeking to emulate them, it is not the same everywhere. Mainstream political parties and their economic agendas are not precisely identical, even though such different groups (such as Democrats and Republicans) can belong to the same establishment. What is an establishment (or populist or other anti-establishment) view can change over time.

Different cultures of course will have leaders, but their particular “establishment” ideologies may be significantly and perhaps dramatically different. The current Chinese establishment’s guiding faith in part overlaps with (resembles) but nevertheless is not identical to the creed prevailing in the United States establishment. Or, compare a primitive rural culture and that of a modern Western industrial nation.

However, as a rough and admittedly simplified guideline, one can summarize the ruling Western economic ideology of the post-World War Two period. It is a “capitalism” that in principle generally adores free (open) markets for goods and services, free trade, and free movement of capital, as well as (subject to immigration concerns) fairly free movement of people. Such economic goals (and political and social gospels related to them) are labeled and valued as good and desirable by the so-called establishment. Often they are honored as being rational, reasonable, intelligent, sensible, and prudent. In the post-World War Two span, these good outcomes have intertwined with globalization, which the elites (power structure), likewise generally (on balance) bless. Therefore these authorities view populism, at least to the extent it endangers such good capitalism and the related “structure (arrangement) of things”, as generally bad (or less good; inferior).

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The establishment responded to the British outcome with passionate rhetoric. The dangers of supposedly overly left-wing or right-wing movements, or excessively nationalistic or protectionist ones, or fringe or radical groups must be handled somehow, right? Or so such currently empowered elites advise audiences.

Leading central banks and regulators such as the European Central Bank, Federal Reserve Board, Bank of England, and International Monetary Fund of course stress their devotion to their assorted mandates. Indeed their noble quest to secure praiseworthy aims such as stable prices (sufficient inflation), maximum employment, and economic growth are on behalf of “all of us”. Yet such loosely-defined legislative directives in practice provide these economic high priests wide scope for their interpretation.

In practice, central bankers, even if widely-revered, generally reflect the key economic and political doctrines and ambitions of traditional (current establishment) leaders. And “populism”, though one cannot define it scientifically, though its historical and current international appearance is not everywhere the same, still can “shake the existing economic and political situation and its institutional structures up a lot”. And such resulting uncertainty and disruption (and especially big changes) on balance would be bad (or at least not very good), right? So the Brexit vote was a bad (undesirable and unfortunate) outcome. Populist pressure, especially if it involved challenging the independence of central banks, might even make it more difficult for central bankers to achieve their beloved mandates. Leading central banks nowadays consequently want to preserve the basic structure and trends of the post-World War Two world “order”, to preclude revolutionary or even mildly substantial changes in it.

Therefore, the British “Leave” vote and its aftermath probably will encourage various leading central banks such as the Fed, ECB, Bank of England, and their allies to battle even more fiercely than before against populist menaces. Continued sluggish growth (or a recession), rising unemployment, or a renewed sovereign or private sector debt crisis (whether in Europe or around the globe), would inflame populist ardor, particularly given anger over widespread economic inequality. The central banks therefore likely will sustain existing highly accommodative policies such as yield repression and money printing for longer than previously anticipated, perhaps expanding them “if necessary”.

FOLLOW THE LINK BELOW to download this article as a PDF file.
Populism and Central Banks (7-12-16)

US CORPORATE PROFITS- PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES © Leo Haviland, November 1, 2011

Recent historically high nominal United States corporate profit levels are a key factor inspiring many to buy and hold US stocks. Bullish forecasts regarding future net earnings, especially when such predictions extend out to misty medium term or murky long run time horizons, sustain and bolster this enthusiastic ownership. In turn, stock rallies sometimes boost optimism regarding potential corporate profitability and overall economic growth, for many have faith that equity marketplaces are forward-looking indicators for “The Economy”.

Has the US entered a blessed New Era of very high corporate profitability that will stretch happily out into the indefinite future? Probably not. Has America revived the wonderful time of the Goldilocks economy? Probably not. Higher nominal corporate profits and ascending nominal stock prices, when accompanied by rising nominal GDP, can assist national confidence and encourage spending in the short term. However, since the nominal levels are not the real (genuine) ones, they do not translate into an equivalent amount of real and permanent prosperity.

Yet even if very elevated corporate profitability does not continue, what may have caused a sustained notable upward shift relative to long run history in the ratio of nominal US corporate profits to nominal GDP? To some extent, it reflects corporate cost-cutting measures and other battles to improve efficiency. The easy money policies of the Federal Reserve Board (sustained low interest rates; money printing) and its allies and massive deficit spending (stimulus) perhaps play roles. But picture the context of sluggish to declining real US household income, still-damaged consumer balance sheets, high unemployment, weak housing prices, and very low consumer confidence. With that domestic (home) background, high US nominal corporate profits- and especially a more elevated nominal profit versus GDP ratio- also arguably reflects economic globalization trends and profits captured from overseas. If so, then relatively high American corporate profits do not entirely reflect (do not fully represent) actual overall US prosperity (“Our Economy”), merely that of many of its corporations.

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US Corporate Profits- Patterns and Perspectives (11-1-11)