GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.

 

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DOLLAR DEPRECIATION AND THE AMERICAN DREAM © Leo Haviland August 11, 2020

In the film “Wall Street” (Oliver Stone, director), Gordon Gekko claims: “It’s all about bucks, the rest is conversation.”

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DOLLAR DEPRECIATION DANGERS

For many decades, the United States dollar has led the foreign exchange field as the key currency for global trade as well as financial reserves. Over that time span, the greenback’s predominance to a significant extent encouraged, sustained, and reflected widespread (although not unlimited) American and global faith in the wisdom and goodness of American cultural values and the persuasive and practical ability of the nation to be a (and sometimes the) critical guiding force in international affairs. Although the dollar obviously has had numerous extended periods of appreciation and depreciation since the free market currency dealing regime began in the early 1970s, the dollar’s crucial role in the increasingly intertwined global economic system has seldom been significantly questioned or challenged for over an extended period of time. For almost ten years, from its major bottom in July 2011 until April 2020, the overall trend of the dollar in general was bullish.

Therefore few gurus fear a significant depreciation in the US dollar from its relatively lofty April 2020 high. However, the probability of a noteworthy dollar slump is much greater than most believe.

An underlying factor promoting a dollar tumble is the gradually declining share of America as a percentage of world GDP. Also, both political parties, not just the current US Administration, and especially in the coronavirus era, probably want the dollar to weaken from its recent summit. The great majority of the country’s politicians preach their allegiance to a strong dollar, but they also endorse economic growth.

Two additional phenomena make the dollar particularly vulnerable nowadays. First, although many leading nations have increased their government debt burdens in recent years, America’s situation probably has worsened significantly more than most others in recent months. Moreover, America already faced widening federal budget deficits encouraged by the tax “reform” enacted at end 2017. Plus don’t overlook the ongoing ominous long run debt burden, looming from factors such as an aging population. How easily will America service its debt situation? And America’s corporate and individual indebtedness also is substantial.

Second, the intensity and breadth of America’s cultural divisions has increased in recent times, especially during the Trump era. American confidence in the nation’s overall direction has slumped in recent months. As US citizen faith in the country’s situation declines, so probably likewise will (or has) that of foreigners in regard to America.

Declining faith in American assets (and its cultural institutions and leadership) can inspire shifts away from such assets. American marketplaces will not be completely avoided given their importance, but players can diversify away from them to some extent. Not only Americans but also foreigners own massive sums of dollar-denominated assets (debt instruments, stock in public and private companies, real estate; dollar deposits). Such portfolio changes (especially given America’s slowly declining importance in the global economy) will tend to make the dollar feeble.

Suppose nations and corporations increasingly elect, whether for commercial or political reasons, to avoid using the dollar as the currency via which they transact business. That will injure the dollar.

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A five percent fall in the “overall” dollar level from its April 2020 high may not make much difference in the near term for US stocks and debt securities. However, a roughly five percent dollar drop is a warning sign for them, and especially for stocks. All else equal, a weaker dollar tends to boost the nominal price of dollar-denominated assets such as stocks and commodities. But history shows that this relationship is not inevitable. Phenomena other than dollar depreciation influence US securities trends. Keep in view the considerations described above undermining the dollar, and thus the desire to hold dollar-denominated instruments.

Admittedly, strong American corporate earnings encourage buying (and holding) of US stocks. But the coronavirus situation and responses to it have devastated calendar 2020 earnings. Suppose that contrary to widespread hopes and predictions, calendar 2021 corporate earnings do not rebound significantly (sufficiently) from dismal 2020 depths. What if the prayed-for V-shaped economic recovery does not emerge? If corporate earnings remain relatively modest (or slide) going forward, and if the dollar continues to weaken from its April 2020 height, dollar depreciation probably will intertwine with an equity slump.

A sustained dollar tumble approaching ten percent (and especially a fall greater than ten percent) probably will help to push the S+P 500 and related stock prices quite a bit lower. Many equate strong (high; rising) United States stocks over the long run as a signal or proof of the triumphant progress of the American Dream’s economic, political, and social principles. Therefore a linked and sustained decline in both the dollar and American stocks probably would damage to some extent the persuasive rhetoric of the current version American Dream itself.

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Even if US government debt yields in this scenario initially slump from around current low levels due to a renewed “flight to quality”, and even if the Federal Reserve and its central banking teammates maintain their quantitative easing and yield repression schemes, inflationary forces (encouraged by money printing; see the huge increase in America’s money supply) and heated demand for credit eventually can push government (and corporate) interest rates upward. On the US interest rate front, suppose foreigners become smaller buyers, or even net sellers, of US Treasury securities. Such overseas action would not be an endorsement of America. Due to yield repression, UST real returns currently are negative.

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Dollar Depreciation and the American Dream (8-11-20)

DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE: US STOCKS AND AMERICAN POLITICS © Leo Haviland July 11, 2020

William Butler Yeats said in his poem “The Second Coming”:
“Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

Numerous United States stock marketplace and economic wizards share a common faith that levels and trends in broad-based equity benchmarks such as the S+P 500 adequately represent the nation’s overall current economic “reality”, signal (forecast) the country’s future economic conditions, or both. Conversely, the present-day or prospective economic situation (or both) allegedly are built into or forecast S+P 500 and related stock signposts elevations and trends. Leading promoters of this creed frequently also are apostles of stock investment (buying), especially over the misty long run. Thus strong (bullish) US stocks supposedly equal, reflect, or confirm (at least to a substantial extent and at some point in time) a robust economy.

Assorted economic (commercial; business) variables around the globe of course influence patterns in American (and other international) stock marketplaces. So do political and other cultural factors. The perspectives on, analytical methods regarding, and arguments and conclusions relating to such cultural phenomena nevertheless are entirely subjective (matters of opinion; not scientific). Thus reasonable gurus can and do vary in their enlightened views regarding issues such as how to organize “the” past, present, and future, as well as in their causation and probability assessments regarding one or more marketplaces. This contrasts with the objective (Natural; true for all) sciences such as biology, chemistry, physics, mathematics, and mechanical engineering.

A given financial marketplace such as the S+P 500 and data (variables, facts, factors, evidence, statistics) related to it converge and diverge (lead/lag) in a variety of fashions. Existing relationships can change, sometimes dramatically. Marketplace history is not marketplace destiny.

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The S+P 500 rapidly crashed about 35.4 percent in only one month from its 2/19/20 pinnacle at 3394 to its dismal 3/23/20 trough at 2192. However, it thereafter skyrocketed nearly 47.5 percent to 6/8/20’s 3233, only about five percent beneath 2/19/20’s height. The S+P 500’s current level around 3185 neighbors the early June 2020 high. Generous money printing (quantitative easing) and yield repression (and other assistance) from the beloved Federal Reserve and its central banking allies substantially contributed to the spike from March 2020’s depth. So did massive deficit spending. Substantial bull moves in various important “technology” stocks within the S+P 500, and the related climb in the technologically-composed Nasdaq Composite Index, greatly assisted the upward march and sustained strength in the S+P 500.

Although the Nasdaq Composite Index and many leading (popular; large-capitalization) technology stocks achieved new highs very recently, several actual or probable divergences (and some convergences) within or linked to the S+P 500 stock playground warn that it will be difficult for the S+P 500 to surpass its lofty February 2020 peak by much, if at all, over the next several months. These factors not only probably will undermine the S+P 500 and induce it to start declining, but also will inspire a related fall in the Nasdaq Composite Index.

DIVERGENCE: AMERICAN STOCKS

The poet Wallace Stevens declared: “Nothing is itself taken alone. Things are because of interrelations or interactions.”

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Various forms of divergence (and convergence) relevant to stock marketplaces exist.

These include how a given marketplace recently has moved, or is travelling, relative to its past (or “overall”) history. It can include relationships between “the” stock marketplace (such as the S+P 500 benchmark) and other stock indices (both domestic and foreign), marketplace sectors (such as technology, energy, or finance; emerging marketplace stocks) or particular stocks. An apparent existing relationship between United States stocks and other financial territories such as interest rates (picture the US Treasury marketplace or high-yield corporate debt), the US dollar, and key commodities such as petroleum and base metals can change, sometimes dramatically. For the S+P 500, a stock sector, or an individual equity, its level, trend, and valuation can seem to converge or diverge with its earnings (or other variables).

To what extent has or will America’s coronavirus history, current trends, and future probabilities intersect with the S+P 500? Recall the vicious economic decline and sharp stock slumps during first quarter 2020 as the coronavirus spread worldwide and in America. Yet the significant increase in recent weeks in the America’s coronavirus infection rate contrasts with the persistent strength in the S+P 500, and with the Nasdaq Composite Index’s stellar ascent to all-time highs.

Significant divisions (divergence) and heated conflicts nowadays exist in America’s political and other cultural theaters. Political phenomena of course intertwine with economic ones, including financial marketplaces such as stocks. To some extent, the rally (“high” prices) in American stock benchmarks such as the S+P 500 diverges from the likely enactment (reality) of corporate and capital gain tax increases. In America’s upcoming November 2020 national election, Biden very likely will defeat Trump. The Democrats should retain control of the House of Representatives. The Democrats probably will gain Senate seats, and they have a very good chance of capturing the Senate. This unification of Democratic power on the national level not only will be a dramatic change in government. Tax policies embraced by Biden and the Democrats likely will be bearish factors for the S+P 500.

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Divergence and Convergence- US Stocks and American Politics (7-11-20)

TRADE WARS AND CURRENCY TRENDS IN THE TRUMP ERA © Leo Haviland November 7, 2019

“All I ever asked for was an unfair advantage”, said an oil trader to me many years ago.

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The United States dollar, as measured by its broad real effective exchange rate, probably has started a bear trend and will decline a notable amount from its recent high.

The United States dollar’s glorious bull charge has lasted for a very long time, over eight years, dating back to July 2011. Marketplace history is not marketplace destiny, but the duration of and the distance travelled in the dollar rally is comparable to other extensive ones of the past few decades.

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Trade Wars and Currency Trends in the Trump Era (11-7-19)

JAPAN: FINANCIAL ARCHERY, SHOOTING ARROWS © Leo Haviland October 5, 2018

The famous military philosopher and analyst Carl von Clausewitz states in “On War” (Book Two, chapter 3; italics in original): “Rather than comparing it [war] to art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale.”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

In late 2012, the Japanese political leadership dramatically unveiled its three “arrows” of easy money, flexible fiscal policy, and structural reform to improve the country’s economic performance. In practice, those Japanese political authorities generally represent major financial (corporate; commercial) interests (“Japan, Inc.”). The Bank of Japan’s policies since late 2012, though nominally independent of political and economic power centers, in practice reflects the goals of Japan’s substantial entrenched economic groups and the political representatives and bureaucrats aligned with them.

Monetary policy of course is not the only factor affecting GDP, inflation, and other intertwined variables. Yet Japan’s ongoing government fiscal deficit, though somewhat helpful for promoting growth and inflation, is not the most noteworthy element in the country’s policy array since end-2012. Moreover, the general government debt burden remains massive and likely will remain so for many years. According to the International Monetary Fund, Japan’s general government gross debt as a percent of GDP was 236.4 percent in 2017 (contrast the G-7 average of 118.6pc that year) and forecast at 236.0pc for 2018 and 234.2pc in 2019, dipping only slightly to 229.6pc by 2023 (“Fiscal Monitor”, April 2018, Table A7; the October 2018 update probably will not change Japan’s government debt as a percent of GDP statistics substantially). And structural reform in Japan, which usually crawls forward slowly, has been unremarkable.

The extremely easy monetary policy arrow embraced by the accommodative Japanese central bank for almost six years is the country’s critical weapon. The central bank chief faithfully and repeatedly proclaims that sustained inflation of two percent is a praiseworthy goal (as essentially do the sermons preached by other leading central banks such as the Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank). The Bank of Japan’s ongoing tools to achieve its aims include sustained yield repression and massive quantitative easing (money printing). So far, the Bank of Japan, despite its determination, has not come close to achieving two percent inflation. The consumer price trend in recent months manifests merely minor progress on that front. And although Japan’s quarterly GDP for April-June 2018 may signal enhanced year-on-year economic performance, International Monetary Fund forecasts are not as sunny.

Yet what else has the Bank of Japan (as a representative and reflection of the country’s political and economic generals) really battled to achieve via its remarkably lax monetary strategy? A notion of improved and acceptable economic growth and frequent reference to an iconic two percent “price stability target” do not offer a complete story. Moreover, the enthusiastic declaration of assorted monetary policy plans and tactics does not directly reveal important aspects about the economic (financial; commercial; marketplace) landscape within which the interrelated GDP and inflation goals are targeted and such extraordinary easy money programs are designed and applied.

In practice, what are the intermediate connections (means; methods) to the achievement of the allegedly ultimate ends of satisfactory growth and sufficient inflation? One key approach of the Bank of Japan’s magnificent scheme relates to currency depreciation, the other to stock marketplace appreciation. Japan’s central bank sentinel quietly has aimed to achieve the related objectives of Yen weakness and Japanese stock marketplace strength.

In recent times, Japan deliberately has kept a relatively low profile in foreign exchange, trade, and tariff conflicts. Compare the furious racket nowadays, especially since the advent of the Trump presidency, around the United States and China (and also in regard to the European Union, Mexico/Canada/NAFTA).

Nevertheless, for several years, Japan has waged a trade war (engaged in fierce currency competition) without capturing much international political attention or media coverage. The Bank of Japan (and its political and economic allies) in recent years has fought vigorously to depreciate the Yen (especially on an effective exchange rate basis) and thereby to bolster Japan’s current account surplus. Japan’s overall economic growth relies significantly on its net export situation. The Yen’s substantial retreat and its subsequent stay at a relatively low level and the significant expansion in the country’s current account surplus are glorious triumphs.

Since late 2012, the Bank of Japan also has struggled ferociously to rally the Japanese stock marketplace (boost corporate profits). As of early autumn 2018, this guardian has achieved significant victories in this campaign as well.

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Japan- Financial Archery, Shooting Arrows (10-5-18)