GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS
Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.
Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.
Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.
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Though global marketplaces and their problems intertwine, let’s concentrate on recent European debt developments and related statements alongside a review of several European interest rate spread relationships. This inquiry underlines that the heated efforts by European (and American and other) economic (political) generals have yielded only partial progress in vanquishing the challenges of the worldwide international crisis. So the worldwide international economic crisis probably will march onward for quite some time. And there is more than a little chance that it will worsen.
A review of yield spreads between the 10 year government debt of Germany and the key Eurozone nations of Spain and Italy over the past year or so underlines the gradually growing sovereign debt and banking stresses on Europe (and therefore on other territories and marketplaces). In addition, these widening European spread trends, especially when reviewed in the context of stock marketplace, currency, and commodity ones, point out the limited (merely partial) successes of efforts to solve the European sovereign debt and banking crisis in particular (and the worldwide economic disaster in general). These spreads warn of dangers to European (and global) economic growth.
Compare the timing of the German 10 year’s high on 4/11/11 at 3.51pc with the April 2011 lows in the German 10 year’s spread against Spanish, Italian, and Hungarian government debt. Keep in mind the pattern of higher lows in the Spanish/German and Italian/German spreads since mid-April 2011. For this mid-April 2011 timing perspective and its aftermath, remember the S+P 500’s high around then (on 5/12/11 at 1371) and that in the broad Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (4/11/11 and 5/2/11 at 762).
Euro FX weakness also reflects the Eurozone (European) crisis. Note the rough parallel since spring 2011 between the declining Euro currency (peak versus the US dollar 5/4/11 at 1.4940) and the gradual widening of the Spanish/German and Italian/German 10 year government spreads.
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European Debt Dangers- Selling Solutions, Buying Time…Yielding Results (1-17-12)
The decline in the Euro FX does more than reflect Europe’s sovereign debt and banking crisis. Europe does not stand or act alone. Euro currency weakness underlines the continuing epic worldwide economic disaster that emerged in 2007. The sustained slump in the Euro FX since spring 2011 warns that the worldwide economic recovery that began around early 2009 is slowing. Some headway has been made in containing Eurozone (and other European) problems, but that progress has been insufficient and it probably will remain so for at least several more months. The Euro FX will depreciate further from current levels.
First, despite the major sovereign debt and banking problems, the Eurozone’s political and economic leadership has the political desire and (ultimately) sufficient economic power to preserve the Eurozone. This means keeping even members such as Greece within it. The problems of the so-called peripheral nations in key respects have become those of the entire fraternity. The Eurozone may rely on outside economic help from the International Monetary Fund or other countries to help pay for the repairs. However, the region as a whole will, “if push comes to shove”, resolve the thorny difficulties itself. And even if Greece did exit the Eurozone, remaining Eurozone members probably would band together to keep the Eurozone intact.
For some time, the so-called fixes may involve pushing the problem (dangers) off to a more distant future. The buying-time strategies (hoping that economic recovery eventually will enable a genuine escape) of course will have some costs. For example, picture inflation risks, slower growth, and some suffering by creditors.
The substantial role of the Euro FX in official reserves underlines the importance of the Eurozone and its Euro FX in the world economic order. Most of the world surely does not want the Euro FX to disappear entirely, or to suffer a massive depreciation (as opposed to a further small or even a modest depreciation). Thus at some point (“if really necessary”), the world outside of Europe would ultimately bail out Europe.
Consequently the declines in the Euro FX over the past several months confirm worldwide economic sluggishness (and slumps in stock marketplaces and commodities). So further falls in the Euro FX may reflect- or help lead to- even more declines in equity and commodity playgrounds. That additional Euro FX debasement may even reflect or accelerate an economic downturn (not just stagnation) in some regions, and not just European territories. Thus Euro FX currency depreciation alone will not solve the Eurozone’s (or overall European) problems.
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Eurozone- Breaking Up Is Hard To Do (1-3-12)
Since the current economic crisis emerged in 2007, a rough pattern has been that major movements and levels in US Treasury ten year note yields have preceded or coincided with those in the S+P 500. Thus, “in general”, plummeting UST yields have been paralleled by diving stock prices. And rising interest rates are connected to rallies in stocks. So in today’s world, gurus and guides often underline that higher and higher UST rates fit an economic recovery (health) scenario. In contrast, collapsing rates indicate looming (or actual) disaster; hence the popularity of flight to quality and safe haven commentary in regard to UST. Such relationships between the UST 10 year note and stocks (and variables allegedly bound to them) of course help forecasters to assess probabilities for and predict important debt and equity trend changes. Looking forward, this ongoing pattern may well persist.
Yet at some point, and arguably within the next several months, the present relationship between the US ten year and the S+P 500 may change. Thus rising UST yields eventually may coincide with sinking stocks. What key trading levels for the 10 year should one keep an eye out for? Such trigger point ranges will vary over time. So anyway, what guidelines for nowadays? If the US 10 year note yield floats decisively above the 2.50 percent level, and if stocks rally very little as that yield barrier is breached, that would hint the current (2007-2011) UST/S+P 500 relationship is altering.
As the global economic crisis flows on and on, many of its intertwined actions and participants (and thus marketplace relationships) may remain relatively unchanging. But they are not stagnant. Today’s marketplace voyagers should wonder if the crisis has drifted closer and closer to a new round of difficulties. Look at European yields, and place Germany on the sidelines. Focus instead on Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy. These countries show that severe economic problems (and downturns) are not always or inevitably associated with falling (or low) government interest rates.
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Marketplaces and Policies – Making Connections (11-29-11)
In recent years, there’s been a close linkage between trends in the S+P 500, commodities “in general”, and the United States dollar. Recent weakness in commodity currencies versus the US dollar coincides with and thus warns of continued declines in commodity benchmarks such as the broad Goldman Sachs Commodity Index and key stock indices such as the S+P 500. The worldwide economic crisis that erupted in 2007 has not been substantially solved.
The price and time trends of the commodity currencies from the US dollar cross rate perspective intertwine closely with key moves in stock and commodity benchmarks. Viewing them as a group, the five currencies soared higher against the US dollar from late 2008/early 2009 for over two years, until spring 2011/July 2011. Commodities in general and the S+P 500 made key bottoms in winter 2009 around the time of those in commodity currencies. The S+P 500 and the broad S+P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) then advanced dramatically for over two years.
In 2011, double tops in the commodity currencies (late April/early May; late July) link closely with the equity and commodity summits. The drops from late July 2011 are noteworthy because the S+P 500 subsequently fell decisively under the summer 2008 1265/1313 range (the financial crisis accelerated from around that 2008 time) and beneath the 4/26/10 top at 1220.
Many observers have faith that a substantial QE3 action will rally the S+P 500 (and commodities). Won’t history repeat itself? However, maybe history will refuse to do so, and stocks will climb very little before resuming their decline. Money printing is not a genuine repair policy for real economic problems. Despite the fearful Fed’s determination to maintain an extremely low Federal Funds rate, a renewed money printing enterprise also eventually may inspire interest rate jumps in US debt playgrounds.
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Commodity Currencies and Economic Cracks (9-12-11)
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