GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.

 

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EASING COMES, EASING GOES: US GOVERNMENT INTEREST RATES © Leo Haviland, March 13, 2017

In “Uncle John’s Band”, the Grateful Dead sing: “‘Cause when life looks like easy street, there is danger at your door”.

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OVERVIEW

Many marketplace generals nowadays have faith that rising United States government interest rates reflects both sustained adequate American economic growth and the likely development of inflation sufficient to satisfy the Federal Reserve Board’s two percent yardstick. In addition to GDP growth and rising inflation and inflation expectations, observers also should focus on other issues and their consequence for assorted marketplace trends and relationships.

Viewpoints of natural (equilibrium, fair or true value, normal, average, appropriate) prices and price overshooting or undershooting (expensive, cheap; too high, too low) reflect subjective opinions, not science. In any case, relatively few observers ask whether the Federal Reserve guardian will permit inflation benchmarks to exceed for a relatively long time (and somewhat decisively) its adored two percent signpost. Such overshooting by notable inflation variables will tend to propel government yields higher than many expect. The US Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) jumped 2.5 percent year-on-year in January 2017. Will personal consumption expenditure (PCE) inflation also overshoot the Fed’s two percent target?

The Fed likely will tolerate inflation target overshooting for some time because it wants to be confident that the achievement of its inflation goal will be durable. Such an indulgent policy regarding overshooting still permits the Fed to engage in gradual increases in policy rates (Federal Funds), especially as asset prices (such as American stocks and real estate) have soared since their dismal global economic crisis lows and as the prospective US fiscal outlook appears rather expansionary (and even overly stimulative).

Also, trust in the ability of the Fed and its allies such as the European Central Bank to manage inflation is widespread. How many audiences worry whether the years of devoted yield repression have created a reservoir of pent-up inflation, which the Fed’s gradual rollback of accommodation (permitting higher Federal Funds and government rates) will unveil and reflect?

America has a substantial public debt. Not much attention focuses on the likelihood and implications of growing American federal budget deficits, even without any legislative changes, over the next decade and beyond. See the US Congressional Budget Office’s “The Budget and Economic Outlook; 2017 to 2027” (1/24/17), as well as “Federal Debt and the Statutory Limit” (3/7/17). According to the NY Times (3/10/17, pA21), on 3/13/17 the CBO is expected to release its judgment on the proposed House Republican legislation, the American Health Care Act, aiming to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare).

Moreover, the media, politicians, and Wall Street have spent much attention on President’s Trump’s potential tax “reform” and express hope regarding his misty infrastructure plans. But not many pundits stress that Trump’s tax scheme (even without reference to Obamacare), if enacted, likely will cause massive rises in budget deficits. The Fed may elect to raise rates more quickly (aggressively) than some predict if Congress adopts much or all of the fiscal scheme of Trump and his comrades. In any case, most people do not ask how enthusiastic foreigners (who own a huge slice of Treasury debt) will be to keep financing growing budget shortfalls. The Fed sheriff, unlike the European Central Bank and Bank of Japan, is no longer wedded to quantitative easing (securities purchasing tied into money printing), so it will not rush to add many UST obligations to its balance sheet.

Also, all else equal, substantial questions regarding national leadership quality can undermine both political and economic confidence in that nation. This situation can encourage higher interest rates, a weaker currency, or both. Donald Trump lacks government insider experience. Domestic and international faith in his political leadership ability (and in the US Congress as a whole) is not high. In the film “Easy Rider” (director Dennis Hopper) a character underlines that “it’s real hard to be free when you are bought and sold in the marketplace.”

Fierce, widespread, and substantial ongoing partisan political (economic) divisions likewise risk weakening America’s currency and promoting increased government interest rates. Trump’s victory did not unite an already significantly divided America. In America, there are liberals (progressives) and conservatives (traditionalists). Populists (both left and right wing) confront the establishment (elites). Globalists contend with nationalists.

Trump’s “Make America Great Again!” and “America First” slogans and many of his policy pronouncements obviously appeal to large numbers of Americans. However, they do not attract or inspire many (and arguably a majority of) citizens. Though both the House and Senate are Republican-controlled, not all Republicans warmly support Trump and his policies. Although Trump triumphed in the Electoral College, he decisively lost the popular vote tally. The popular vote outcome obviously reflects America’s sharp political divisions. Also, the Russian President “directed a vast cyberattack aimed at denying Hillary Clinton the presidency and installing Donald J. Trump in the Oval Office, the nation’s top intelligence agencies said in an extraordinary report” (NYTimes, 1/7/17, ppA1, 11). Trump’s popular vote defeat and the report on Russian political interference undermine Trump’s political “legitimacy” (faith in it) and thus his ability to lead effectively.

America has other substantial splits and fractures. It has rich versus poor, haves versus have-nots. Look at the nation’s substantial economic inequality. Consider divisions relating to race (ethnicity), gender, religion, age, geographic region, and urban/rural. Fiery quarrels rage over tax and spending policies and priorities, health care (Obamacare), trade policies, the appropriate degree of economic regulation, abortion rights, gun ownership, and environmental issues such as climate change.

With such ongoing, wide-ranging, and seemingly intractable American divisions and related passionate debates and accusations, worries increase regarding “how anything (good; productive; necessary) can get done”. Escalating doubts relating to leadership and concerns regarding the consequences of persistent divisiveness can encourage growing fears at home and abroad regarding the nation’s current and potential political and economic outlook. This horizon consequently may not necessarily encourage a “flight to quality” by buyers into the government debt securities of that country. Instead, particularly when inflation also is increasing and budget deficits likely will rise, low (deteriorating) confidence can spur interest rate rises.

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Easing Comes, Easing Goes- US Government Interest Rates (3-13-17)

RHETORIC AND GLOBAL CURRENCY TRENDS © Leo Haviland, February 13, 2017

In the movie “Casablanca”, Signor Ferrari asks the proprietor of Rick’s Café Americain: “My dear Rick, when will you realize that in this world today isolationism is no longer a practical policy?” (Michael Curtiz, director)

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DIVIDING LINES

On America’s 2016 election campaign trail and thereafter, President Donald Trump’s impassioned populist rhetoric has encompassed striking slogans such as “Make America Great Again!” and “America First!” All United States patriots of course want their country to be great. Such wordplay, however, especially appeals to citizens wary of or hostile to phenomena such as “the establishment” (elites), globalization, and (overly) free trade.

Many of America’s current and proposed domestic programs and their consequences are not divorced from international ones. Lines between (and definitions of) “domestic” and “international” are not necessarily clear. Many so-called “economic” issues interrelate with political, military, and social arenas. Prior to America’s recent national election season, many observers across the political spectrum lamented the country’s (and world’s) substantial income and wealth inequality. In any case, let’s concentrate primarily on the international trade and currency front, even though other assorted US domestic as well as a range of global issues significantly entangle with it.

Most Americans praise “free markets” and “capitalism” as “good”, but they also want them to be “fair”. A currency level and trend can symbolize relative power and its changes. Thus a “strong” dollar may be praiseworthy (and excite national pride), and the country should not permit the greenback to become “too weak” or “feeble”. But why should Americans tolerate evils such as “unfair trade” and a “too strong” dollar? As in competitive sports, isn’t it right to have a “level playing field”? Surely massive persistent trade (or current account) deficits between two nations suggest something inappropriate in policies and practices may be going on! Can’t some protectionism for American industries be good, at least in the right circumstances?

Thus America’s President and many of his supporters loudly warn of changes in tariffs and taxes. They squawk about walking away from, tearing up, or renegotiating trade agreements. They hint America will respond to the currency manipulation or excessive depreciation engaged in by its trading partners.

However, all economic (political) language, policies, and behavior related to notions of goodness, fairness, and reasonableness (rationality) merely represent personal perspectives. So whether a given trade agreement such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal treats the US fairly or appropriately, whether it is good or bad for America, is a matter of opinion. Whether a given US dollar cross rate (such as that between the dollar and the Chinese renminbi) or broad real trade-weighted US dollar level are “good”, “bad”, “too high” (“expensive”; “overshooting”), “too low” (“cheap”; “undershooting”), or “fairly (reasonably, appropriately) valued” (or near some allegedly natural, rational, logical, or equilibrium price) likewise express opinions.

Moreover, in the deeply interconnected and complex global economy and multipolar political world, even the mighty and zealous United States cannot institute many of its key programs on others without expecting a notable response (push-back) from others threatened or infuriated by them. After all, other countries around the globe, whether implicitly or explicitly, also generally place their nation first and foremost in their political and economic calculations. Most foreign countries (their leaders) do not want to seem too timid in their dealings with America. And not all Americans, or even all Republicans, applaud or even support the President’s policies, which themselves may change as time passes and negotiations proceed.
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A nation and its internal political groupings often manifest significant partisan quarrels, which sometimes become ferocious. Everyone knows that history likewise displays a continuum, from relative peace and harmony to various expressions of war, battle, and violence. America’s notable current divisions are wide-ranging. Divides exist within economics and politics, but also involve topics such as age, race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and geography.

Widespread talk on the international stage of competitive depreciation, currency wars, and trade battles reflects the increasing strains on and within an increasingly fractured “global economic order”. The significant and wide-ranging internal economic divisions within America (and many other leading nations) to some extent mirrors and encourages such international economic (and political) tensions and changes.

Multilateral diplomatic discussions do not necessarily result in better (or worse) outcomes than bilateral ones. The current American Administration apparently prefers in the international economic (and political) realm to conclude one-on-one deals between countries (their strong leaders).

Some guides declare “life is a game.” Regardless of the faith of some luminaries, not all economic (or political or other cultural) arenas and interactions (including negotiations) are zero-sum games, or necessarily have clear winners and losers. Both (or most; or all) sides in a financial contest (whether commerce/business in general or international trade and currency in particular) may turn out to be winners (or losers) to varying extents. In any event, it is conceivable that particular sets of economic policies and responses to them can result (whether sooner or later) in unhappy (costly) outcomes for the nation promoting them, or even for numerous or a majority of countries (including those not directly participating in the fascinating discussions and artful deals on the main table).

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Rhetoric and Global Currency Trends (2-13-17)

ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND: COMMODITY CURRENCIES © Leo Haviland September 26, 2016

“For, you see, so many out-of-the way things had happened lately, that Alice had begun to think that very few things indeed were really impossible.” Lewis Carroll, “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland” (Chapter I)

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

Concentrating on and comparing exchange rates of “commodity currencies” offers insight into assorted interrelated marketplace relationships. Since the shocking eruption and terrifying acceleration of the global economic crisis in late 2007/2008, the major price trends for eight “commodity currencies” roughly (and of course not precisely) have ventured forward in similar fashion on a broad real effective exchange rate (“EER”) basis. Over that time, this basket of assorted commodity currencies generally has intertwined in various ways with very significant trends in the broad real trade-weighted United States dollar (“TWD”), emerging marketplace stocks in general, and broad commodity indices such as the S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (“GSCI”).

The substantial rally in the broad real trade-weighted United States dollar (“TWD”) that embarked in mid-2011 played a key part in encouraging (confirming) and accelerating bear movements in emerging marketplace stocks and commodities “in general”. The S+P 500’s monumental rally over its spring 2011 interim high diverged for about four years from the trends in emerging equity realms and commodities. However, the TWD’s late 2015 ascent above its March 2009 peak was a crucial event. This dollar climb helped propel the S+P 500 downhill following 5/20/15’s 2135 pinnacle in conjunction with the emerging stock marketplace and commodity trends.

In January/February2016, these linked price patterns reversed. The TWD has depreciated modestly and stocks (emerging marketplaces as well as those of America and other advanced nations) rallied. Commodities (particularly oil) jumped. The benchmark United States Treasury 10 year note yield initially ascended from its 1Q16 low. This relatively unified reversal across marketplace sectors paralleled the entwined moves since mid-to-late 2015. These current marketplace interrelationships (“roughly trading together”) probably will persist for the near term, regardless of whether the pattern of mid-2015 to first quarter 2016 resumes or that since mid-first quarter 2016 continues. Marketplace history of course need not entirely or even substantially repeat itself.

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Commodity currencies, associated with countries with large amounts of commodity exports, are not confined to developing/emerging nations. Because commodity exports are important to the economies of advanced countries such as Australia, Canada, and Norway, the currencies of these lands likewise can be labeled as commodity currencies.

The bearish currency paths (effective exchange rate basis) of key emerging and advanced nation commodity exporters up to first quarter 2016 resembled the similar trends among them during the 2007-09 worldwide economic disaster era. However, these commodity currencies depreciated notably more in that recent dive than during 2007-09’s extraordinary turmoil. In addition, the lows attained by most of them decisively pierced the floors achieved about seven years previously. Moreover, the TWD rallied more sharply in its bull leap to its January 2016 elevation than it did during the past crisis.

The feebleness up to the 1Q16 lows for the commodity currency group, as it involved both advanced and emerging marketplace domains (as it did in 2007-09), reflected an ongoing global (not merely emerging marketplace) crisis. Substantial debt and leverage troubles still confront today’s intertwined worldwide economy. The bear trip of many commodity currencies into early first quarter 2016, especially as it occurred alongside big bear moves in emerging marketplace stocks (and in the S+P 500 and other advanced stock battlefields) and despite long-running extremely lax monetary policies, underlined the fragility of the relatively feeble global GDP recovery.

Therefore key central bank wizards, concerned about slowing real GDP and terrified by “too low” inflation (or deflation) risks, have fought bravely to stop the TWD from appreciating beyond its January 2016 top and struggled nobly to encourage rallies in the S+P 500 and related stock marketplaces. Yield repression (very low and even negative interest rates) promotes eager hunts for yields (return) elsewhere. Indeed, rallies in the S+P 500 (and real estate) may help inflation expectations (and inflation signposts monitored by central banks such as consumer prices) to crawl upward. Given their desperate quest to achieve inflation goals, central banks probably approve of at least modest increases in commodity prices as well as appreciation by commodity currencies in general.

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Noteworthy rallies in these commodity (exporter) currencies from their recent depths tend to confirm (inspire) climbs in commodities in general and emerging (and advanced) nation stock marketplaces. Renewed deterioration of the effective exchange rates of the commodity currency fraternity “in general” likely will coincide with renewed firming of the broad real trade-weighted US dollar. Such depreciation in the commodity currency camp probably will signal worsening of the still-dangerous global economic situation and warn that another round of declines in global stock marketplaces looms on the horizon.

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“He was an honest Man, and a good Sailor, but a little too positive in his own Opinions, which was the Cause of his Destruction, as it hath been of many others.” “Gulliver’s Travels”, by Jonathan Swift (Part IV, “A Voyage to the Country of the Houyhnhnms”, chapter 1)

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Looking forward, numerous entangled and competing economic and political variables generate a substantial challenge for explaining and predicting the interconnected financial marketplaces in general, including the commodity currency landscape. The commodity currency group as a whole (“CC”) has appreciated roughly twelve percent from its late calendar 2015/first quarter 2016 depth. What does a review of the adventures in commodity currencies since the assorted late 2015/1Q16 bottoms in the context of other marketplace benchmarks portend? Commodity currencies in general probably are establishing a sideways range. The overall camp of EERs (apart from what may happen to individual ones) will not rally much (if at all) above recent highs. The CC camp eventually likely will renew its overall depreciation, with the various EERs heading toward their noteworthy lows attained several months ago.

Although the CC rally since its 1Q16 bottom retraces some of its prior collapse, the TWD itself has dropped only modestly from its peak and thus remains quite strong. Moreover, note the fall in the broad GSCI (and the petroleum complex) since early June 2016. A still-robust TWD not only underlines potential for renewed weakness in the CC complex, but also confirms commodity feebleness and warns of risks to the recent bull move in emerging marketplace stocks (and even to the astounding S+P 500). China is a key commodity importer. As China’s EER continues to ebb (while Japan’s has strengthened), the ability of the CC clan to produce only a moderate overall percentage rally in their collective EER to date hints that world economic growth remains sluggish. Emerging marketplace stocks in general, despite their rally since 1Q16, remain substantially beneath their September 2014 summit.

Although leading global central banks devotedly retain highly accommodative policies such as yield repression and money printing, the inability of US Treasury 10 year note yield to rise much above its 7/6/16 low at 1.32 percent tends to confirm this picture of unimpressive (and even slowing) global expansion. Optimists underscore the S+P 500’s rally to a new peak on 8/15/16 at 2194 from its 1Q16 trough. Yet that new record elevation merely neighbors May 2015’s plateau, exceeding it by just 2.8 percent.

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There is significant marketplace and political talk of trade wars, growing protectionism, and anti-globalization. Much of this wordplay links to populist challenges to the so-called establishment (elites). But even some establishment politicians have become less enamored of free trade. Fears of trade conflicts and protectionist barriers weigh on the CC domain as a whole.

For commodity currencies, much depends on Federal Reserve policy. At present, although the Fed did not boost rates in September, it currently seems fairly likely to do so in December 2016 (assuming no dramatic drop in stocks occurs before then). Especially as the European Central Bank, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan remain married to their highly accommodative schemes, this Fed action will help to rally the TWD and thus tend to weaken the CC armada. Nevertheless, the Fed and other central banks probably will fight to keep the dollar from surpassing its 1Q16 summit; doing so helps to protect stock (and real estate) prices and thus to reduce populist political advances.

The result of the US Presidential election on November 8 naturally remains uncertain. Unlike the EERs of the other seven commodity currencies, the Mexico EER has slumped beneath its first quarter 2016 low. Mexico faces severe domestic political challenges, and ongoing low oil prices wound its economy. However, the increasing potential for a Trump victory and resulting trade conflicts and immigration disputes also have helped to push Mexico’s EER downhill. The Mexican peso crisis of the early 1990s should not be forgotten.

Significant ongoing American political divisions risk further weakness in the US dollar, regardless of who wins the exciting Presidential sweepstakes. The US has a long run budget challenge regardless of who emerges victorious. Though the TWD issue is complex, a Trump victory likely is more bearish for the TWD than a Clinton one. Comments from overseas (and numerous domestic) leaders suggest lack of confidence in Trump’s abilities and policies, which arguably would be reflected in reduced acquisition (or net selling) of dollar-denominated assets such as US government securities (and corporate debt) and American stocks. Trump’s budget proposals, if enacted, will likely expand the deficit considerably and thus probably would encourage interest rate rises. A Trump triumph likely would be bearish for the US dollar in general, even if the dollar rallied against the Mexican peso on a cross rate basis. However, though numerous respected forecasters predict a close outcome, Clinton probably will defeat Trump. In any case, all else equal, a Democratic victory increases the odds of a Fed rate hike in the near term.

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Adventures in Wonderland- Commodity Currencies (9-26-16)

CHINA: BEHIND THE GREAT WALL (c) Leo Haviland June 7, 2016

“Seek truth from facts.” Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping

CONCLUSION

China’s era of miraculous economic growth has marched into history. Yet China’s real GDP output in the past few years, and even 2015, has been robust in comparison to that of most other nations. The majority of international financial wizards faithfully proclaim that Chinese GDP likely will remain strong, at over six percent for the next several years.

China’s GDP strength over the past three or four years nevertheless derived significantly from its widespread national willingness to boost debt (leverage) levels substantially. This significant debt expansion coincides with the current unwillingness or inability of the nation’s political and economic leadership to do much to subdue the debt issue. China’s continued debt building (perhaps assisted by other factors) perhaps will achieve its praiseworthy growth levels, at least for a while.

And trend shifts during first quarter 2016 in various stock (both advanced and emerging), interest rate, currency, and commodity marketplaces (particularly dramatic rallies in the S+P 500 and the petroleum complex) inspire optimism regarding global growth prospects. Despite potential for small rate increases by the widely-admired Federal Reserve, monetary policy in America and elsewhere likely will remain highly accommodative, thereby assisting expansion in developed nations and China.

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However, review the patterns in China’s stock, central government 10 year note, and currency marketplaces. Those domains, when interpreted together and alongside a broad array of other key global financial marketplaces, not just the S+P 500 and oil, on balance nowadays suggest Chinese growth over the next few years probably will be less than most gurus expect. In today’s interconnected economic world, slower than anticipated Chinese economic expansion probably will be reflected by more sluggish growth elsewhere than generally forecast.

Politics and economics entangle in both advanced and emerging/developing nations. China’s political elite (notably its Communist party chiefs) seeks to ensure its own power and overall national political, economic, and social stability. Insufficient GDP growth and related widespread popular fears regarding income levels and economic inequality probably endangers these goals.

What do the political rhetoric and actions over the past few years (including recently) by China’s leaders reflect? Quite significantly, they portray increasing concern about their nation’s current and prospective economic situation, particularly its growth level and outlook.

To deflect and dilute growing popular concern about a weakening economic situation (slowdown; feebler growth than desired), and to maintain their political power and influence, China’s political leaders have acted vigorously on both the external and internal fronts. In the foreign sphere, they increasingly quarrel with other nations; on the internal landscape, efforts to control political and other social activities and dialogue have increased. These policies from China’s authorities tend to confirm the trends of slowing Chinese (and global) growth.

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China- Behind the Great Wall (6-7-16)